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COMMENT
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL?: VIRGINIA'S NEW SEX
OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTE
ELIZABETH P. BRUNS*
Amid horror stories on the nightly news about high crime
rates and public cries for safer streets, many states have enacted
statutes requiring sex offenders to register upon entering a
community. Typically, these statutes require a convicted felony
sex offender,1 upon release from prison or upon commencement
of probation if a sentence of confinement was not imposed, to
register his name, address, other identifying information, and the
nature of his offense with local law enforcement. At least twenty-
six states now have such laws. 2 Virginia enacted its sex offender
registration statute in 1994. The goal of these statutes is to
deter repeat offenses and to protect children and others from
becoming victims of recidivists. The demand for these statutes
is so great that Congress included a provision to implement a
consistent nationwide system of sex offender registries in its
1994 crime bill.4
This Comment examines the Virginia sex offender registration
statute and its constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment.
Part I examines the general policy rationales for and against
registration statutes. Part II explains the Virginia statute. Part
III analyzes the Virginia statute under the Eighth Amendment
* J.D. 1995, William and Mary School of Law; A.B. 1991, Duke University.
1. Felony sex offenses typically covered by registration laws include rape and other
violent sex offenses against adults as well as less violent offenses involving children. See,
e.g., Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-3821 (1990).
2. The following states have some type of sex offender registration statute: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Deleware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Matthew J. Herman, Note, Are the Children of Illinois
Protected from Sex Offenders?, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 883, 893 n.83 (1995).
3. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, ch. 362, 1994 Va. Acts 514 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-
298.1, -298.3, -390.1 (Michie 1995)).
4. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Regis-
tration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071 (Supp. 1994)) (directing the Attorney General to establish guidelines for state sex
offender registration programs).
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and the United States Supreme Court's doctrine on cruel and
unusual punishment. The Comment concludes with an opinion
that the Virginia statute is constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.
I. POLICY BEHIND SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
States have cited rising crime rates, high recidivism rates
among sex offenders, and the need to prevent sex offense victims
from becoming sex offenders themselves as evidence of the need
for sex offender registration statutes. For example, according to
one study, substantiated child sexual assaults in Virginia in-
creased from 102 attacks in 1975 to 1,720 in 1990.6 In addition,
the allegedly "highly repetitive nature of these crimes has pro-
vided a strong incentive for States to monitor the whereabouts
of convicted sex offenders."' Some evidence suggests that child
sex offenders are generally "serial offenders." 7 For instance, one
study concluded that the 'behavior [of sex offenders] is highly
repetitive, to the point of compulsion,' and found that 740/0 of
imprisoned child sex offenders had one or more prior convictions
for a sexual offense against a child."8 Another study found that
as many as eighty percent of untreated sex offenders released
from prison commit more offenses. 9 Some commentators believe
that recidivism rates are actually higher than reported. 10 These
commentators believe that sex offenders may commit "hundreds
of unreported crimes," and studies based on rearrest or recon-
viction therefore understate the rate of recidivism.1" States jus-
5. Joe Jackson, Mothers of Abused Children Testify for Tougher Laws, VIRGINIAN -
PILOT, Sept. 11, 1992. at D3 (reporting on work of the Virginia Commission on the
Reduction of Sexual Assault Victimization).
6. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, JACOB WETTELING CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN
ACT, H.R. REP. No. 392, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1993) (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR
MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, SELECTED STATE LEGISLATION: A GUIDE FOR EFFECTIVE
STATE LAWS TO PROTECT CHILDREN 40 (3d ed. 1993)).
7. Id. (citing A Study of the Child Molester: Myths and Realities, J. AM. CRIM. JUST.
17, 22 (1978)).
8. Id.
9. Robert E. Freeman-Longo & Ronald V. Wall, Changing a Lifetime ofSexual Crime:
Can Sexual Offenders Ever Alter Their Ways?, PSYCH. TODAY, Mar. 1986, at 58.
10. See A. Nicholas Groth et al., Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child
Molesters, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 450, 457 (1982). ("The low recidivism rate generally
attributed to [sex] offenders can be understood due to the low visibility of such offenses....
[Miost of [sex offender's] recidivism goes undetected.").
11. David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases,
78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 573 (1994).
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tify registration statutes on the premise that children and others
need to be protected and point to high recidivism rates and the
fact that "sexual offenders frequently go back to positions where
they can prey on children." 12 States argue that sex offender
registration statutes will help them address the problems of
increasing crime rates and repeat offenders.
. Policymakers' concern over the fact that victims of sex offen-
ders can become sex offenders themselves provided additional
motivation for the Virginia statute. The Virginia Commission on
the Reduction of Sexual Assault Victimization (the "Commission"),
headed by Lieutenant Governor Donald S. Beyer, focused much
of its effort on the rehabilitation of child sexual assault victims
to prevent them from becoming adult offenders. Lieutenant Gov-
ernor Beyer said that a "guiding principle" for the Commission's
work was the following statistic: ninety percent of sex offenders
who began their criminal actions in childhood or adolescence
were themselves the victims of child sexual assault.13 The Com-
mission endorsed the legislative proposal for a sex offender
registry and lobbied for its passage before the Virginia General
Assembly."
Although the policy objectives motivating registration statutes
discussed above are compellifig, they do not tell the whole story.
First, recidivism rates are not necessarily higher for sex offen-
ders than for other felons. In fact, some studies show a lower-
rate for sex offenders. For example, 1989 Bureau of Justice
Statistics study found that the recidivism rate for sex offenders
was lower than for most other criminals."s Of the offenses studied,
only homicide had a lower recidivism rate than sex crimes.'6
Although many argue that low recidivism rates can be explained
by the fact that sex offenders commit many unreported crimes,
the same is probably true for other offenders. In fact, "no study
has demonstrated that sex offenders have a consistently higher
or lower recidivism rate than other major offenders studied for
12. Warren Fiske, Beyer Proposes Registry of Sexual-Abuse Felons, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Jan. 21, 1994, at D5 (quoting Virginia Lt. Gov. Donald S. Beyer, Jr.).
13. Anna Barron Billingsley, Message to Assembly Break Sexual Abuse Pattern Proposals
Include a Registry of Convicted Child Sex Offenders, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 8,
1994, at B6.
14. See Beyer Wants Virginia to Have Sex Offender Registry, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
1994, at B3; Billingsley, supra note 13, at B6; Fiske, supra note 12, at D5; Panel to
Recommend Sex Offenders' Register, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 8, 1994, at D3.
15. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983
6 (1989).
16. Id.
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the same time period with the same methods."'17 At the very
least, the data is unclear. Consequently, legislatures should be
careful not to jump to emotional conclusions about the recidivism
of sex offenders.
Second, sex registration statutes fail to recognize that once an
offender has been convicted, served his time, and paid his debt
to society, he should be given a chance to live his life without
any additional punishment or stigma. A convicted sex offender
is not given the chance to prove he is rehabilitated if he is forced
to register after his release. Instead, he must register with the
police upon arriving in a new community and announce to local
law enforcement that the legislature deems him to be a risk to
the community, regardless of whether he actually does pose such
a risk. 8 A central principle in our law of evidence is the character
evidence rule, which prevents an inference of bad character from
bad acts.19 That is, a person should not be labeled a "bad person,"
and therefore more likely to commit crimes, solely from the fact
that he has previously committed a crime. One commentator has
argued that "[slociety has made a judgment to allow its impris-
oned criminals to rejoin society with relative anonymity after
serving their sentences .... Any condition that requires a defen-
dant to label himself ... or to be shunned by his fellow citizen[s]
violates [the] concept of the dignity of [humanity]." 20
When evaluating the rationales behind sex offender registra-
tion statutes, policy makers should take into account the potential
ineffectiveness of the statutes. Of course, although the potential
ineffectiveness of the statute alone is not a constitutional chal-
lenge, it is an important consideration for analysis of whether
registration is punishment, 21 and if so, whether it is proportional
to the offense.22 Critics have argued that California's sex offender
17. Bryden & Park, supra note 11, at 572-73 ("Studies of sex offenders with smaller
samples and different follow-up periods have shown both higher and lower recidivism
rates for certain populations of sex offenders.").
18. The Virginia statute allows a registrant to petition a court to expunge his
information from the registry upon a showing that he no longer poses a risk to society.
VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-298.3 (Michie 1995). This provision, however, does not relieve the
registrant of his initial duty to register with the police upon entering a community after
his release from confinement.
19. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
20. Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of
Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1382 (1989).
21. See infra section III.A.2.d.
22. See infra section III.B.
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registration statute is ineffective,2 and at least one court has
doubted the efficacy of registration statutes.24 The possible in-
effectiveness of these statutes is also important to policy analysts
who must determine whether states should seek other more
effective solutions. Several other legislative options could address
the need to protect children from recidivists and to prevent
victims from becoming offenders themselves. For example, inten-
sive treatment of sex offenders can be successful in preventing
recidivism. 25 Some experts assert that treatment, in addition to
imprisonment, is necessary to "break the chain of victimization. 2 6
In the end, policymakers may find that registration statutes are
a hard-line, yet ineffective, response to rising crime and high
recidivism rates.
II. THE VIRGINIA STATUTE
In 1994, Virginia enacted a sex offender registration require-
ment on the recommendation of the State's Commission on the
Reduction of Sexual Assault Victimization. 27 The statute has three
main components. First, section 19.2-298.1 sets forth who must
register, the procedures for registering, the information a reg-
istrant must furnish, and the penalty for failure to register.
Second, section 19.2-390.1 provides the purpose of the law and
provisions for maintenance of and access to the registry. Third,
section 19.2-298.3 sets forth procedures for expungement of in-
formation from the registry.
Section 19.2-298.1 is the main section of the law. The statute
provides that the following people must register with the De-
partment of State Police as part of the sentence imposed upon
conviction: (1) every person convicted on or after July 1, 1994,
for a felony in violation of certain sections of the Virginia Code,2
23. Kenneth Reich, Many Simply Ignore Law; Sex Offender Registration Not Working,
Experts Say, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1986, at One-1.
24. State v. Douglas, 586 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) ("The efficacy of
criminal registration statutes is doubtful.").
25. See Freeman-Longo & Wall, supra note 9, at 58.
26. Id.
27. Act of Apr. 6, 1994, ch. 362, 1994 Va. Acts 514 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 55 19.2-
298.1, -298.3, -390.1 (Michie 1995)).
28. The felonies requiring registration are the following: VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-61
(rape); § 18.2-63 (carnal knowledge of child between ages of 13 and 15 years- of age); §
18.2-64.1 (carnal knowledge of certain minors); S 18.2-67.1 (forcible sodomy); S 18.2-67.2
(object sexual penetration); S 18.2-67.3 (aggravated sexual battery); 5 18.2-67.5 (aggravated
rape and other crimes); S 18.2-67.5 (taking indecent liberties with children); and S 18.2-
1995]
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and (2) every person serving a sentence of confinement or under
community supervision on July 1, 1994, for a felony covered by
this section.29 In addition, all persons convicted of felony violations
under laws of the United States or other states substantially
similar to those listed must register with the Department of
State Police within thirty days of establishing residence in Vir-
ginia. 30 The duty to register includes the duty to keep the
registration current, which requires reregistering within thirty
days following any change of residence.3 '
The registrant must register with the police his name, all
aliases, the date and locality of the conviction for which registra-
tion is required, date of birth, social security number, current
address, a description of the offense or offenses for which con-
victed, and the same information for convictions prior to July 1,
1994, for any of the specified offenses or for a similar offense
under federal law or other states' laws.32 A knowing and inten-
tional failure to register or knowingly providing materially false
information is punishable as a Class One misdemeanor. 33
The second main section of the statute, section 19.2-390.1,
provides that the purpose of the sex offender registry is "to
assist the efforts of law-enforcement agencies to protect their
communities from repeat sex offenders and to protect children
from becoming the victims of repeat sex offenders by helping to
prevent such individuals from being hired or allowed to volunteer
to work directly with children."- The section also provides guide-
lines for access to the registry. The Department of State Police
may disseminate registry information, upon request, only to au-
thorized officers or employees of (1) a criminal justice agency, (2)
a public school division, (3) a private, denominational, or parochial
school, or (4) a child welfare agency or a registered or unregis-
370.1 (taking indecent liberties with a child by person in custodial or supervisory
relationship). If the victim is a minor or physically helpless or mentally incapacitated as
defined in the Code, the following felonies also require registration: S 18.2-361B (crimes
against nature; relatives); S 18.2-366B (incest).
Examples of crimes for which convicted offenders are not required to register are
stalking, S 18.2-60.3; marital sexual assault, S 18.2-67.2:1; prostitution, S 18.2-346; forcing
or soliciting a minor to be a subject of child pornography, S 18.2-374.1; and indecent
exposure, S 18.2-387.
29. S 19.2-298.1A, B.
30. 5 19.2-298.10.
31. Id.
32. 5 19.2-298.1D.
33. 5 19.2-298.1E.
34. 5 19.2-390.1A.
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tered small family day care home.3 The registry information may
be used only for the "purposes of the administration of criminal
justice or for the screening of current or prospective employees
or volunteers."3 Dissemination of information for other purposes
is prohibited and a willful violation is punished as a Class One
misdemeanor. 7
The third main provision of the statue is section 19.2-298.3,
which provides for expungement of information from the regis-
try. A person required to register may petition the court in
which he was convicted or the circuit court of the jurisdiction
where he resides for removal of his name and all identifying
information from the registry.39 The court must hold a hearing
at which the petitioner may present witnesses and other evi-
dence.40 If the court is satisfied that the petitioner no longer
poses a risk to public safety, the court must grant the petition.41
If the petition is not granted, the petitioner must wait at least
twenty-four months to file a new petition. 2
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Convicted sex offenders have challenged registration statutes
in several states on the grounds that the registration imposes a
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 43 The Eighth Amendment
provides that, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."4
35. S 19.2-390.1B.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. S 19.2-298.1A.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See State v. Lammie, 793 P.2d 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216
(Cal. 1983); People v. King, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (Ct. App. 1993); In re DeBeque, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 441 (Ct. App. 1989); In re King, 204 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Ct. App. 1984); People v. Mora,
206 Cal. Rptr. 256 (Ct. App. 1984); People v. Mills, 146 Cal. Rptr 411 (Ct. App. 1978);
State v. Douglas, 586 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Every state, except Connecticut and Vermont, has a
similar constitutional provision. See DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TODAY 383
(1976). In State v. O'Brien, 170 A. 98, 102 (1934), Vermont's highest court held that the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is part of the state's common law. See
FELLMAN, supra, at 383. Connecticut's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
can be found in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 53-20 (1968). which makes the infliction of cruel
or unusual punishment a crime. See FELLMAN, supra, at 383.
1995]
178 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 2:171
Article I, section 9 of the Virginia Constitution contains almost
identical language. 5 For the prohibition to apply to a statute,
the law must impose "punishment."46 Thus, in evaluating the
Virginia sex offender registration law, the first question is whether
the registration requirement is punishment for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment.
A. Is the Virginia Registration Requirement Punishment?
The Supreme Court in Trop v. Duies47 discussed the method
for determining whether statutes are penal in its evaluation of
whether denationalization as punishment for wartime desertion
was violative of the Eighth Amendment.s The Court stated that
its decisions addressing this question were generally based on
determinations of the purpose of the law.49 The Court stated that
"[i]f the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punish-
ment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others,
etc.-it has been considered penal. But a statute has been con-
sidered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to
accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose."50 The
Court added that, although a statute may have both penal and
nonpenal effects, the "controlling nature of such statutes normally
depends on the evident purpose of the legislature. ' 1
1. Purpose
The purpose of the Virginia sex offender registration statute
as stated therein is "to assist the efforts of law-enforcement
agencies to protect their communities from repeat sex offenders
and to protect children from becoming the victims of repeat sex
offenders by helping to prevent such individuals from being hired
45. "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. VA. CONST. art. I, S 9.
46. VA. CONST. art. I, S 9.
47. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
48. Although Trop involved the Eighth Amendment, the Court did not limit its analysis
to that context. That is, in evaluating whether the law involved was penal, the Court
drew on cases that involved the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws
and bills of attainder, because in those cases it was also necessary to determine whether
a penal law was involved, as those constitutional provisions apply only to statutes imposing
penalties. Id. at 95-96.
49. Id. at 96.
50. Id. (citations omitted).
51. Id.
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or allowed to volunteer to work directly with children."5 2 Al-
though this provision could be read as providing only two pur-
poses, to assist law enforcement and to protect children, it
appears to have a third purpose, to prevent sex offenders from
being hired or allowed to volunteer to work with children. The
third purpose, unlike the first two, which are clearly nonpenal,
requires close scrutiny. Obviously, this third purpose was in-
tended to serve the second purpose of protecting children from
repeat sex offenders. Arguably, by including this phrase, the
legislature explicitly attempted to prevent convicted sex offen-
ders from obtaining employment in certain sectors of the work
force. This purpose is arguably punitive because it focuses on
the offender and not the children the statute is apparently
designed to protect. In effect, this third purpose imposes addi-
tional penalties on a sex offender because of his conviction.
Admittedly, this purpose does not seem particularly punitive
when applied to offenders who committed their crimes against
children, considering the limitations on persons who may receive
registry information and the purpose of protecting children. As
applied to offenders whose victims were adults, however, the
goal of preventing offenders from obtaining employment which
involves direct contact with children is more punitive since it is
less closely related to the offense committed.
Sex offender statutes that courts have determined to be non-
penal have had similar purposes: to assist law enforcement agen-
cies and to protect children.P These statutes, however, protect
children by assisting law enforcement agencies in their investi-
gation of sex crimes, rather than by preventing sex offenders
from obtaining certain employment, as in the Virginia statute.
For example, in the recent decision State v. Ward,54 the Supreme
Court of Washington examined whether Washington's sex of-
fender registration statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto
law. In ex post facto analysis, as in Eighth Amendment analysis,
the initial question is whether the statute imposes criminal pun-
ishment.55 In deciding that the registration statute was regulatory
and not punitive, the court in Ward noted that the legislature
clearly enacted the statute to help community law enforcement
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995).
53. See State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062,
1065 (Wash. 1994).
54. 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
55. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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agencies protect their communities.56 Similarly, in State v. Noble,57
the Arizona Supreme Court found the Arizona sex offender
registration statute to be nonpenal because, among other factors,
it had the regulatory purpose of assisting law enforcement agen-
cies in investigating future offenses and locating and apprehend-
ing recidivists. 8 The Virginia statute, in contrast, has the purpose
of protecting the community and assisting law enforcement agen-
cies, but also appears to have the secondary purpose of prevent-
ing offenders from obtaining certain kinds of employment.
In determining the legislature's purpose, the Court in Trop
stated that the "severity of the disability imposed as well as all
the circumstances surrounding the legislative enactment" are
relevant.,9 As applied to the Virginia registration statute, these
two factors tend to negate each other. First, the severity of the
disability can be quite extreme. A sex offender who has served
his time, and perhaps has been out of jail for several years, could
be prevented from obtaining employment at a school or anywhere
else where he might have direct contact with children. The
offender may have committed his offense against an adult victim,
which would render the disability extreme, considering that he
may not be a risk to children at all. The statute may protect
these individuals, however, through section 19.2-298.1, which al-
lows an offender to petition the court to expunge his name from
the registry on a showing that the offender no longer poses a
risk to public safety.60 Second, the circumstances surrounding the
legislative enactment tend to show that the legislature was
primarily concerned with protecting children.61 The true intent
of the Virginia legislature in enacting the registration statute is
at least questionable at this point.
2. Mendoza-Martinez Factors
In the absence of conclusive legislative intent, a court examines
several factors to determine whether a statute is regulatory or
punitive. The Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez"
set forth the "tests traditionally applied to determine whether
56. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1068.
57. 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992).
58. Id. at 1224.
59. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 n.18 (1958).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.1 (Michie 1995).
61. See Fiske, supra note 12, at D5; Jackson, supra note 5, at D3.
62. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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[a legislative act] is penal or regulatory in character." 63 The Court
listed these tests as follows:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a pun-
ishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment- retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned .... P
This list is neither exhaustive nor dispositive, but should provide
guidance in determining the nature of the statute.66 Several
courts have used these factors to determine whether sex offender
registration statues constitute punishment for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment and the constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws.6 This Comment will focus on the following four
factors: whether the sanction imposes an affirmative disability
or restraint, whether it has been regarded historically as punish-
ment, whether it serves the traditional aims of punishment, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternate purpose
assigned.
a. Affirmative Disability or R estraint
The first factor, whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint, is possibly met in the Virginia registration
statute. In the abstract, the statute does not impose such a
restraint because it does not explicitly impede an offender's
movement in any way. However, it could have a chilling effect
on the offender's freedom of choice to move to a new community.67
63. Id. at 168.
64. Id.
65. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980).
66. See State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992) (finding on a close decision
that registration of child sex offenders is not punitive); In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 222
(Cal. 1983) (finding that sex offender registration is punitive as applied to certain
misdemeanants); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 644 (I1. 1991) (finding that the duty
to register is not punishment); State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1077 (Wash. 1994) (finding
that sex offender registration is not punitive).
67. See State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Agid, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Washington sex offender registration has "very real punitive impacts,"
including a "chilling effect on [the sex offender's] freedom of choice to move to a new
place").
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As the dissent in the Washington case of State v. Taylor8 pointed
out, "[it is inconceivable to think that one who must, as his first
act, go to local law enforcement and announce that he is a felon
convicted of a sex offense will not be deterred from moving in
order to avoid divulging that ignominious event."6 9 Similarly, the
Arizona intermediate appellate court in State v. Noble"0 held that
Arizona's sex offender registration statute imposed an affirmative
disability or restraint because registration "impaired employabil-
ity, subject[ed] registrants to increased police scrutiny, and last[ed]
for life."71 The court based this conclusion on the fact that the
registration information was available to employers and volunteer
agencies if the employment or volunteer service would place the
offender in regular contact with minors.7 2 The Arizona Supreme
Court, however, disagreed with the appellate court's decision,
and held that registration was not an affirmative disability or
restraint.7 3 Noting the statutory safeguards on disclosure of reg-
istration information and employers' and agencies' current access
to conviction records, the court stated that the "registration's
marginal impact on the information available to non-law enforce-
ment personnel is not 'the kind of affirmative disability or re-
straint usually associated with criminal punishment.' 74 An
important distinction between the Virginia and Arizona statutes
is that under Arizona's version, registration information is dis-
closed to potential employers only if the victim of the offender's
underlying offense was a minor.7 5 In contrast, Virginia allows this
information to be disclosed to employers regardless of the age
of the offender's victim.76 The difference between the two statutes
could determine a court's opinion as to whether the Virginia
registration requirement imposes an affirmative disability or
restraint.
In In re Reed,77 a California court found that California's sex
offender registration statute imposed an affirmative disability or
restraint. In reaching a decision that the California sex offender
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 808 P.2d 325 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 829 P.2d 1217 (1992).
71. Id. at 329.
72. Id.
73. State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992).
74. Id. at 1222 (citations omitted).
75. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 13-3821 (1990).
76. VA. CODE. ANN. S 19.2-390.1B (Michie 1995).
77. 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983)..
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registration statute was cruel and unusual punishment as applied
to certain misdemeanor offenders, the court held that the regis-
tration requirement imposed an affirmative disability or restraint
under the Mendoza-Martinez factors.7 8 The court noted that
'"[a]lthough the stigma of a short jail sentence should eventually
fade, the ignominious badge carried by the convicted sex offender
can remain for a lifetime."'1 9 The court also emphasized the
potential compulsion and restraint that could result from "ready
availability" to the police, a purpose of the registration require-
ment.80 The California statute at issue in Reed differed, however,
from the Virginia statute in two important respects. First, the
California statute required certain misdemeanor sex offenders to
register,81 whereas the Virginia statue imposes the duty only on
felons.82 Second, although an offender could be relieved of the
duty to register after a period of time, the California statute did
not provide a means for expunging the initial registration. This
deficiency factored into the court's decision in Reed as to Whether
the registration statute imposed an affirmative disability or re-
straint.8e In contrast to the California statute, the Virginia statute
provides a means for expunging the information from the initial
registration.8 4 In addition, under both the California and Virginia
statutes, a convicted offender is protected by the same consti-
tutional safeguards against police harassment as any other per-
son.85 Thus, although Reed provides some good arguments as to
why a sex offender registration requirement is an affirmative
disability, the differences between the California and Virginia
statutes limit the applicability of those arguments.
On the other side of the argument is the Supreme Court of
Washington's decision that the Washington sex offender regis-
tration statute is not an affirmative disability or restraint.86 In
reaching this decision, the court noted that most of the infor-
mation required by the statute was already on file with at least
one criminal justice agency, that the physical act of filling out
78. Id. at 218, 220.
79. Id. at 218 (quoting In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1973) (emphasis added)).
80. Id. (citing Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Crim-
inal Malpractice," 21 UCLA L. REV. 1191, 1222 (1974)).
81. Id. at 217.
82. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-298.1 (Michie 1995).
83. Reed, 663 P.2d at 218.
84. S 19.2-298.3.
85. See People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (I1. 1991) ("[Riegistrant's constitutional
safeguards will still be in place to protect him from unwarranted police harassment.").
86. State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1994).
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the registration form could hardly create an affirmative disability,
and that an offender is free to change residences so long as he
complies with the requirements of the statute. 87 The court em-
phasized that, although the defendant argued that dissemination
of the registration information to the public had a punitive effect
on registrants, the dissemination was significantly limited by the
statute to circumstances that require the prevention of future
harm, not the punishment of past offenses. 88 In contrast, the
Virginia statute does not authorize disclosure of the information
to the general public under any circumstances, and, in addition,
it imposes criminal sanctions on those who release the information
in violation of the statute.89 Under the Washington Supreme
Court's analysis, therefore, the Virginia statute would be unlikely
to be construed as an affirmative restraint or disability.
In summary, a convicted sex offender in Virginia could make
several arguments that the registration requirement imposes an
affirmative restraint or disability. He could argue, as did the
defendant in State v. Taylor9 0 that the registration imposes a
restraint on his movement to a new community. 91 He could also
argue that registration impairs his employability, particularly
because disclosure to employers is not limited to offenders who
had child victims. Another route would be to persuade the court
that registration subjects the defendant to increased police sur-
veillance and harassment. Most likely, these positions would be
countered with arguments similar to those found in the Noble
and Ward decisions, which found that these disabilities arose
from the conviction itself and the defendant's conduct leading to
the conviction, rather than from the registration requirement.92
A court, however, could find that the requirement is an affir-
mative disability or restraint.
b. Historically Regarded as Punishment
The second Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the condition
imposed by the statute has been regarded historically as punish-
87. Id. at 1069.
88. Id. at 1069-71 (finding that "the statutory limits on disclosure ensure that the
potential burdens placed on registered offenders fit the threat posed to public safety").
89. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-390.1B (Michie 1995); see also Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 637
(finding that because "it is a criminal offense, for law enforcement officials to convey this
information to the public, it is unlikely the information the registrant supplies will be
distributed to the public, and so no stigma attaches").
90. 835 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
91. Id. at 250.
92. See Adams, 581 N.E.2d at 641 ("We fail to see how any stigma attaches to a
registrant that is not already present through his own actions.").
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ment, probably is not fulfilled by the Virginia registration statute.
In Lambert v. California,93 the United States Supreme Court
stated that a felon registration city ordinance was, at most, a
law enforcement technique designed for the convenience of law
enforcement agencies. 94 In State v. Ward,95 the Washington Su-
preme Court held that registration historically has not been
regarded as punishment. 96 The court cited Lambert and stated
that "[r]egistration is a traditional governmental method of mak-
ing available relevant and necessary information to law enforce-
ment agencies." 97 In contrast, the Supreme Court of Arizona in
State v. Nobl9 8 found that sex offender registration statutes have
historically been regarded as punishment. 99 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Noble court referred to the Supreme Court case of
Weems v. United States,10° which held that a sentence of perma-
nent government surveillance was cruel and unusual punish-
ment. 101 The Noble court also noted that the California Supreme
Court had described sex offender registration as an "ignominious
badge."'12 The California statute, however, applied to those con-
victed of misdemeanors, an important fact in the court's decision
in the California case.0 3 The Virginia statute, in contrast, applies
only to felons. 04 In addition, Virginia law enforcement officials
may not release registry information to the public, which makes
the statute less likely to have the effect of so-called "scarlet
letter" punishments.05 The court in Noble limited its finding,
however, because the Arizona statute limited access to the reg-
istration information, and thus "dampened its stigmatic effect."'0 6
93. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
94. Id. at 229.
95. 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994).
96. Id. at 1072.
97. Id.
98. 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992).
99. Id. at 1222.
100. 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
101. Noble, 829 P.2d at 1222-23.
102. Noble, 829 P.2d at 1222 (citing In re Birch, 515 P.2d 12, 17 (Cal. 1973)).
103. 217 U.S. at 366.
104. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-298.1 (Michie 1995).
105. See Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). See generally
Brilliant, supra note 20; Jeffrey C. Filcik, Note, Signs of the Times: Scarlet Letter Probation
Conditions, 37 WASH. U. J. URS. & CONTEMP. L. 291 (1990); Rosalind K. Kelley, Note,
Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations in Sentencing - Are They
Constitutional, 93 DIcK. L. REV. 759 (1989); Leonore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet Letter
Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is Today's Probation Condition, 36 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 613 (1988).
106. Noble, 829 P.2d at 1223.
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The Virginia statute can be distinguished from the registration
law analyzed in Noble because it applies only to felons and does
not allow release of information to the public. These character-
istics and the tradition of registration statutes as law enforcement
tools lead to the conclusion that the Virginia registration statute
probably does not fit the second Mendoza- Martinez factor, whether
the sanction has been regarded historically as punishment. No-
tably, the California Supreme Court in In re Reed'0' stated that
the Mendoza-Martinez factors were relevant considerations rather
than "a checklist of absolute requirements," and therefore, the
fact that sex offender registration statutes have not been re-
garded historically as punishment is not dispositive. 10 8
c. Promote Traditional Aims of Punishment
The Virginia statute promotes retribution and deterrence, the
traditional aims of punishment. Although the legislature's stated
objectives are to protect children and assist law enforcement, it
seems that the ultimate goal these purposes serve is to deter
recidivism among sex offenders. 09 To serve the goal of protecting
children, the statute must prevent sex crimes from occurring.
The legislature's rationale in registering convicted offenders ap-
pears to be to protect children from these offenders and therefore
to prevent the offenders from committing sex crimes again. The
California and Arizona supreme courts have found that those
states' sex offender statutes promote the traditional aims of
punishment. 110 In State v. Noble"' the court held that, at least in
part, the Arizona registration requirement serves the traditional
deterrent function of punishment."' The court said this was so
because "a convicted sex offender is less likely to commit a
subsequent offense if his whereabouts are easily ascertained by
law enforcement officials."' The court in In re Reed"4 found that
107. 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983).
108. Id. at 219.
109. See id. (finding that "[whether or not recidivism is in fact a problem with [certain]
misdemeanants, the legislative intent was surely to deter recidivism by facilitating the
apprehension of past offenders").
110. State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Ariz. 1992); Reed, 663 P.2d at 219.
111. 829 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. 1992).
112. Id. at 1223.
113. Id. (citing State v. Lammie, 793 P.2d 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)) ("Registration for
lifetime places a defendant on notice that when subsequent sexual crimes are committed
in the area where he lives, he will be subject to investigation. This may well have a
prophylactic effect, deterring him from future sexual crimes.").
114. 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983).
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the California statute's purpose of assuring that sex offenders
are readily available for police surveillance served to deter re-
cidivism by facilitating the apprehension of past offenders. 115
Some courts, however, have found that sex offender registra-
tion statutes do not serve the traditional aims of punishment.
The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that an offender
required to register may be deterred from committing future
offenses. 116 The court attempted to dismiss this point by stating
that, although deterrence is a traditional aim of punishment, the
actual conviction and sentencing may serve to deter a registrant,
regardless of whether he is required to register. Although the
court's statement may be true, it does not negate the fact that
the registration also serves to deter the registrant. The court
then stated that "[e]ven if a secondary effect of registration is
to deter future crimes in our communities, we decline to hold
that such positive effects are punitive in nature."'117 Following
this argument to its logical extreme, one could also say that,
because sentencing convicted criminals to life in jail removes
them from the streets and therefore produces the positive effect
of deterring future crimes, a life sentence is not punishment.
Although the Virginia statute does not list the deterrence of
future sex offenses as one of its official purposes, the statute
clearly serves that end.
d. Excessive in Relation to the Alternative, Non-Punitive
Purpose
In one sense, the Virginia statute is not excessive in relation
to its non-punitive purposes of assisting law enforcement and
protecting children. The information that an offender must
furnish 18 is minimal, particularly when compared with similar
statutes from some other states. 19 In addition, the statute does
115. Id. at 219.
116. State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1994); see also People v. Adams, 581
N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1991) ("The absence of corrective measures in the statute, while not
controlling, further impels us to conclude it is nonpenal.").
117. Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
118. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-298.1 (Michie 1995) (requiring offenders to furnish their
name, aliases, date and locality of conviction, date of birth, social security number, current
address, description of offense(s), and information on prior convictions).
119. California registrants must supply a written statement, fingerprints, and a pho-
tograph, CAL. PEN. CODE S 290(e) (West Supp. 1995): Washington registrants must provide
their name, address, date and place of birth, place of employment, crime for which
convicted, date and place of conviction, aliases used, social security number, fingerprints,
and a photograph, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.. S 9.A.44.130(2)45) (West Supp. 1995).
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not require a registrant to give up his constitutional safeguards
against police harassment. That is, although law enforcement
agencies have access to the registry, they still may not arrest a
registrant without probable cause. 20 Potential prearrest suspicion
of a registrant is "incident to the conviction and not a result of
registration as a sex offender."'121 The statute provides a mech-
anism for an offender to petition the court for removal of his
information from the registry. 122 The offender must prove that
he no longer poses a risk to public safety. This feature, in theory,
appears to efisure that the protective function of the statute is
met without burdening those offenders who are not a risk to
society.
A troubling feature of the statute, however, is the lack of
differentiation between sex offenders whose victims were adults
and those whose victims were children. Specifically, although the
stated purpose of the statute is to protect children, information
from the sex offender registry is released to requesting employ-
ers regardless of whether the offender/potential employee com-
mitted an offense against a child. The statute is excessive as
applied to those offenders whose victims were not children. The
Arizona Supreme Court, in State v. Noble, declined to deal with
this precise issue.'2' The court held that the registration require-
ment was not excessive, as applied to child sex offenders, in
relation to its non-punitive law enforcement purpose. 24 The court
specifically left open the question of "whether the registration
requirement would constitute punishment if applied to offenders
convicted of other offenses for which the threat of recidivism
may possibly be less significant or for which registration may
have no valid regulatory purposes."'125 This question may be the
key to a finding that the Virginia statute is excessive in relation
to its nonpenal purpose and therefore constitutes punishment.
Balancing the Mendoza-Martinez factors, then, could weigh in
favor of labelling the Virginia sex offender registration statute
as punishment. The statute is arguably an affirmative disability
or restraint; it promotes deterrence, a traditional aim of punish-
ment; and it possibly is excessive in relation to its non-punitive
120. See Ward, 869 P.2d at 1073.
121. Id.
122. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-298.3 (Michie 1995).
123. State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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purposes of assisting law enforcement and protecting children.
Although registration has not been regarded historically as pun-
ishment, this factor is not dispositive, because the Mendoza-
Martinez factors are not merely a checklist. Instead, they require
a balancing of the strengths of each test.126 Although these tests
are not perfect, they do provide a somewhat objective method
of determining the purpose of a statute absent a clear legislative
intent. If the limitations of the test are taken into account, the
Mendoza-Martinez factors can be helpful in determining whether
a statute's purpose is punitive. Assuming, then, that a court could
regard the Virginia statute as punishment, the next step in an
Eighth Amendment analysis is whether the punishment is "cruel
and unusual."
B. Is the Virginia Registration Requirement Cruel and
Unusual?
The prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishment was
first recognized in the American colonies in 1776, when a ver-
batim copy of a prohibition in the English Bill of Rights was
included in the Virginia Constitution. 127 Thereafter, eight other
states adopted the provision, the federal government included it
in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and, in 1791, it became the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.12
Debates by the framers of the Constitution and comments by
the first Congress suggest that the provision was directed at
prohibiting certain methods of punishment.129 Until the end of
the nineteenth century, the state and federal courts interpreted
the clause as a prohibition against certain methods of punish-
ment.130 The courts viewed the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting
barbarous or "inhumane" methods of punishment, not punish-
ments that were merely excessive in relation to the crime. For
example, "[b]reaking on the wheel [and] flaying alive" were con-
126. See In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216, 219 (Cal. 1983).
127. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969) (citing R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 35-36, 232 (1950)). Section 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
states: "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. VA. CONST. Art. I, S 9.
128. Granucei, supra note 127, at 840.
129. Id. at 841-42.
130. Id. at 842.
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sidered cruel and unusual,"1 but death by hanging for the crime
of stealing fifty dollars worth of merchandise was not.112 The
courts did not accept arguments that the clause covered any
punishment disproportionate to the crime and commentators be-
lieved the clause to be obsolete. 13
In 1892, three justices of the Supreme Court, in a dissent to
O'Neil v. Vermont,1 34 set forth the view that "[tihe whole inhibition
[of the Eighth Amendment] is against that which is excessive
.. Seventeen years later, another claim of disproportionate
penalties was brought before the Court in Weems v. United
States,136 which involved a sentence of fifteen years in chains at
hard labor for a conviction of the strict liability crime of falsifying
an official document. 3 7 In holding that the penalty was an uncon-
stitutional violation of the cruel and unusual clause, the Court
stated that "the inhibition of the [clause] was directed, not only
against punishments which inflict torture, 'but against all punish-
ments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offenses charged."'1 The Court recognized
both that the Eighth Amendment encompassed a flexible stan-
dard and that the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punish-
ments is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."139
Similarly, in holding that denationalization of a member of the
armed services convicted of wartime desertion was cruel and
unusual, Chief Justice Warren stated in Trop v. Dulles40 that
"the Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' 4'
The Court noted that the precise meaning of the phrase "cruel
131. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 981 (1991) (citing B. OLIVER, THE RIGHT OF AN
AMERICAN 186 (1832)).
132. Id. at 980-81.
133. Granucci, supra note 127, at 842 (citing 1 T. CODEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 694 (8th ed. 1927)).
134. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
135. Id. at 340 (Field, J. dissenting).
136. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
137. Id. at 357-58.
138. Weems, 217 U.S. at 371 (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892)
(Field, J., dissenting)).
139. Id. at 378.
140. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
141. Id. at 101.
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and unusual" had not been detailed by the Supreme Court.4 2
Prior cases did not identify precise distinctions between cruelty
and unusualness; the Court observed that if "unusual" has any
meaning apart from "cruel," "the meaning should be the ordinary
one, signifying something different from that which is generally
done."'4 3 The Court emphasized, however, that the basic policy
reflected in the prohibition was part of the Anglo-American
tradition of criminal justice. The opinion recalled that the phrase
was taken directly from the English Declaration of Rights and
that the basic principle for which it stands could be traced back
to the Magna Carta.144 That is, "[tihe basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of [hu-
manity]."14 5 In holding that the Amendment serves to assure that
the state's power to punish be exercised "within the limits of
civilized standards,' 46 the Court stated that "[flines, imprison-
ment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the
enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the bounds of
these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect."147 With
this analysis, the Court strengthened the interpretation of the
Court in Weems that the Eighth Amendment prohibited "greatly
disproportioned" punishment.
Since the Weems and Trop decisions, the Court has applied
this proportionality principle in both death penalty cases and
noncapital cases. Although the Court has applied the principle
extensively in the death penalty area,148 because the Virginia
registration statute imposes noncapital punishment, this Com-
ment focuses on the Court's application of the proportionality
principle in noncapital cases. The Court decided three important
cases in this area during the early 1980s: Rummel v. Estelle,'9
Hutto v. Davis,'10 and Solem v. Helm.51
142. Id. at 99.
143. Id. at 101 n.32.
144. Id. at 100.
145. Id.
146. Id
147. Id.
148. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991); see also Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that a capital sentence for a felony murder conviction
in which the defendant had not committed the actual murder and lacked the intent to
kill was excessive and violated the Eighth Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
598 (1977) (holding that capital punishment is grossly disproportionate for the crime of
rape and is therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
149. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
150. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
151. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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In Rummel, the defendant had previously been convicted of
two felonies, fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain eighty
dollars worth of goods or services and passing a forged check in
the amount of $28.36. Upon conviction of his third felony, obtain-
ing $120.75 by false pretenses, the defendant received a manda-
tory life sentence pursuant to a Texas recidivist statute.152 The
defendant argued that the punishment was disproportionate in
relation to the three underlying felonies on which his sentence
was based. 13 The Court held that the determination of criminal
punishments was a matter of legislative prerogative in the ab-
sence of unique punishments such as the death penalty and.
therefore declined to strike down the sentence. m The court relied
on the fact that the legislature had made a determination to
punish recidivists in a harsher manner than first-time offenders.
The legislature had found that those who repeat criminal acts
have shown that they are incapable of conforming to the norms
of society. 55 The Court nevertheless recognized the applicability
of the proportionality principle in extreme cases. 56 The Court
reached a result similar to Rummel in Hutto, in which the defen-
dant challenged a sentence of forty years in prison for a convic-
tion of possession of less than nine ounces of marijuana as cruel
and unusual.5 7 The Court recognized the proportionality rule but
found that it was inapplicable to the sentence at issue.5 3
Justice Powell wrote a strong dissent to Rummel in which he
expressed the view that Rummel's sentence was grossly dispro-
portionate to his offenses and that penalties for non-capital of-
fenses could indeed be unconstitutionally disproportionate. 9 He
set forth a test of three "objective" factors to determine the
proportionality of a punishment to the crime committed. These
factors were the following: "(i) the nature of the offense[,] ... (ii)
the sentence imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions[,] ... and (iii) the sentence imposed'upon other crim-
inals in the same jurisdiction ....",60
152. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265-66.
153. Id. at 265.
154. Id. at 274, 284.
155. Id. at 276.
156. Id. at 274 n.11 ("This is not to say that the proportionality principle would not
come into play in the extreme example ... if a legislature made overtime parking a
felony punishable by life imprisonment.").
157. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371 (1982).
158. Id. at 374.
159. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Justice Powell's position in his dissent to Rummel was adopted
by the majority in Solem. The defendant in Solem was convicted
of "uttering a 'no account' check for $100" and was sentenced to
life imprisonment without possibility of parole under South Dak-
ota's recidivist statute because of six prior felony convictions.161
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
cruel and unusual punishments "prohibits not only barbaric pun-
ishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the
crime committed."' 62 Justice Powell's majority opinion traced the
history of the meaning of the Eighth Amendment and concluded
that the proportionality rule was "deeply rooted" in American
jurisprudence.'6 Citing Weems and Trop, Justice Powell then
asserted that the principle of proportionality had been recognized
explicitly by the Supreme Court for almost a century. 64 Justice
Powell added, however, that although 'outside the context of
capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality
of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare[,]' .... [t]his does
not mean that proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable in
noncapital cases."'6 The Court then held that "a criminal sentence
must be proportionate to the crime for which the" offender was
convicted. 66
In a proportionality analysis, the Court stated that reviewing
courts should grant substantial deference to the legislature, but
should also consider that no penalty is per se constitutional and
that one day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circum-
stances. 167 The Court then set forth the "objective factors" by
which courts should be guided in an Eighth Amendment analy-
sis.1' These factors are the same as set forth in Justice Powell's
dissent to Rummel: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harsh-
ness of the penalty; (2) sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction; and, (3) sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. 6 9 After Solem, the next
relevant Supreme Court case was Harmelin v. Michigan in 1991.70
161. Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-82.
162. Id. at 284.
163. Id.
164. I& at 286.
165. I& at 289-90 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272) (alteration in original).
166. I& at 290.
167. Id. at 290.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 290-91.
170. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
1995]
194 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 2:171
In Harmelin, the defendant was sentenced to life in prison
without possibility of parole for a conviction of possessing more
than 650 grams of cocaine. At issue was whether this sentence
was cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment.171 Whereas in Trop and many subsequent cases the Court
stressed the flexibility and progressive nature of the Eighth
Amendment, Justice Scalia's opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan
looked to the meaning of "cruel and unusual" at the time the
English Declaration of Rights was drafted.7 2 Although, as dis-
cussed above, the Court had developed a substantial body of law
on the meaning of the Eighth Amendment since the seventeenth
century, Justice Scalia chose to dismiss this intervening prece-
dent and instead compare the 1980 case of Solem to the original
meaning of the Constitution. Justice Scalia concluded that the
Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee and
that Solem was wrong.173 Only Chief Justice Rehnquist, however,
joined this part of Justice Scalia's opinion. Although Justice Scalia
wrote the opinion of the Court with respect to one issue (the
individualized capital-sentencing doctrine), the other three jus-
tices who joined with Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist
on that issue did not join them on the issue of proportionality.
Instead, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Souter, found that the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition
encompasses a narrow proportionality principle. Justice Kennedy
wrote that "the Eighth Amendment does not require strict pro-
portionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only
extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the
crime."'17 Thus, although Justice Scalia's opinion overruled Solem
and declared that the Eighth Amendment contains no propor-
tionality principle, this part of his opinion was not joined by a
majority of the Court. Rather, it was joined only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and the other three justices who concurred in the
judgment approving the defendant's punishment, explicitly disa-
greed with that part of the opinion. As a result, the proportion-.
ality test for noncapital offenses currently encompasses Justice
Powell's three-part test as set forth in Solem and as modified by
Justice Kennedy's Harmelin limitation of the test to only those
punishments that are "grossly disproportionate."
171. Id. at 961-62.
172. Id. at 967 (plurality opinion).
173. Id. at 965.
174. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing
Solem, 463 U.S. at 288).
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The principle of proportionality was essential to the holdings
of the few courts that have ruled that sex offender registration
statutes are a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 175 In In re
Reed,176 the California Supreme Court held that California's man-
datory registration of sex offenders convicted under the misde-
meanor disorderly conduct statute violated the cruel and unusual
provision of the California Constitution. The court cited Weems
and, later, Trop in commenting on the "flexible and progressive
standard for assessing the severity of punishment."' 77 Implicit in
the flexible and progressive character of the constitutional pro-
hibition, the court held, is "the notion that punishment may not
be grossly disproportionate to the offense."'178 The California court
had previously explicitly adopted the proportionality standard
under the California Constitution. 79 The court then analyzed-the
statute under a variation of the three-part proportionality test
endorsed in In re Lynch.80
Under the first part of this test, "an examination of the 'nature
of the offense and/or offender, with particular regard to the
degree of danger both present to society," ' 181 the court found
that the offenses for which persons may be convicted under the
misdemeanor statute were relatively minor. The defendant had
been "convicted of soliciting 'lewd or dissolute conduct' from an
undercover vice officer in a public restroom."'182 The court ex-
plained that under the California code section the defendant had
violated, an offender need not "victimize" anyone in the tradi-
tional criminal sense. Rather, the court explained, only a "gesture,
a flirtation, an invitation for sexual favors, if accompanied by any
175. See In re King, 204 Cal. Rptr. 39, 43 (Ct. App. 1984); In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216,
220-22 (Cal. 1983) (both resting on California constitutional law); cf. State v. Lammie, 793
P.2d 134, 139 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (resting on United States constitutional law); People
v. King, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 223-24 (Ct.-App. 1991) (resting on California constitutional
law); In re DeBeque, 260 Cal. Rptr. 441, 444-45 (Ct. App. 1989) (resting on California
constitutional law); People v. Mora, 206 Cal. Rptr. 256, 258 (Ct. App. 1984) (resting on
California constitutional law); People v. Mills, 146 Cal. Rptr 411, 416 (Ct. App. 1978)
(resting on California constitutional law); People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (I1.
1991) (resting on Illinois and United States constitutional law); Ohio v. Douglas, 586 N.E.2d
1096, 1098-99 (Ohio 1989) (resting on Ohio and United States constitutional law).
176. 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983).
177. Id. at 220.
178. Id.
179. See In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972).
180. Reed, 663 P.2d at 220.
181. Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 216.
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touching and done in a public place, may suffice."'' 1 In addition,
the court observed that the petitioner "is not the prototype of
one who poses a grave threat to society; nor does his relatively
simple sexual indiscretion place him in the ranks of those who
commit more heinous registrable sex offenses."'' 8 Important to
the court's finding on this issue was the fact that the petitioner
did not assert that all sex offenders per se are not recidivists
and therefore should not be required to register, but that persons
convicted under the misdemeanor statute for which the petitioner
was convicted cannot be presumed to be dangerous recidivists.',,
For the second part of the Solem-type test, a comparison of
the penalty with those imposed in the same jurisdiction for more
serious crimes, the court noted several more serious sex-related
misdemeanors for which registration was not required.18 6 The
court also set forth that more serious crimes that were not sex
offenses, such as robbery, burglary, and arson, did not require
registration, even "though violence and victimization are more
pronounced and recidivism is often proved."' 87 Persons who com-
mit these more serious crimes may serve their jail time and get
on with their lives, whereas those convicted under the misde-
meanor statute at issue must carry the "onus" of sex offender
registration. 88
For the last part of the proportionality test, the court found
that California's registration requirement was relatively severe
as compared to other jurisdictions. 189 After balancing the three
parts of the test, the court concluded that the registration re-
quirement as applied to those convicted under the misdemeanor
statute at issue was in violation of the California Constitution's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The court in In re King'90 also concluded that cruel and unusual
punishment existed after applying the three-part proportionality
test. In King, as in Reed, the court examined a semi-as-applied/
semi-facial challenge to the California sex offender registration
statute. That is, the defendant challenged the inclusion of a
183. Id.
184. Id. at 221.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 221-22.
187. Id. at 222.
188. Id.
189. At the time of this decision, only four states had sex offender registration statutes.
Id. at 222.
190. 204 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Ct. App. 1984).
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particular type of offense within those that trigger registration
under the statute.19' At issue was the California sex offender
registration statute that required registration for those convicted
under a misdemeanor indecent exposure statute.192 The court
found that the offenses under the misdemeanor statute were
relatively minor, that several more serious offenses in California
were not punished by imposition of the registration statute, and
that the registration requirement was severe in relation to pun-
ishments in other jurisdictions. 93 The court concluded that "sex
offender registration is out of all proportion to the crime of
misdemeanor indecent exposure."' 94
One important difference between these cases and any case
involving the Virginia sex offender registration statute is that
the Virginia statute requires registration only for persons con-
victed of sex-related felonies. However, all of those felonies are
not exactly similar in degree, and one may be able to make
distinctions on the dangerousness of persons convicted under the
different felony sections.195 That is, for certain offenses, registra-
tion may be too severe a punishment because felons convicted of
those offenses simply are not per se dangerous recidivists. A
semi-as-applied/semi-facial argument similar to those entertained
by the California courts could thus still be addressed to a Virginia
court in challenging the Virginia registration statute. Another
important difference is that the California Supreme Court had
explicitly included the proportionality principle within the cruel
and unusual prohibition of the California Constitution. Although
Virginia federal courts are not inclined to apply a proportionality
rule, 96 as discussed above, the result of the Harmelin decision
was not to overrule the proportionality rule, but to modify its
reach to punishments that are "grossly" disproportionate. A
defendant could argue in a Virginia court that the court must
apply the modified Solem proportionality test. In addition, a
defendant could argue that the Virginia Constitution provides
more protection than the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and, thus, an unmodified Solem test would be ap-
191. Id. at 40.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 41.
194. Id.
195. See supra note 28.
196. The Fourth Circuit has held that a proportionality analysis is unavailable unless
a term of life imprisonment has been imposed. See United States v. Melton, 970 F.2d
1328. 1336 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1027-28 (4th Cir. 1986).
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propriate. Virginia courts, however, have been reluctant to ex-
tend the reach of the Virginia Constitution's guarantee against
cruel and unusual punishment. 197
Most cases that have examined whether sex offender registra-
tion constitutes cruel and unusual punishment have concluded
that it does not violate that prohibition. The minority approach
is that of the two California decisions discussed above, In re Reed
and In re King. Those courts held that the California sex offender
registration statute, as applied to ceitain misdemeanor offenders,
was cruel and unusual in violation of the proportionality guar-
antee of the California Constitution. The majority of courts that
have addressed this issue have examined the proportionality of
the registration statutes and found it to pass constitutional stan-
•dards. 198 One court held that the punishment to the registrant
results from his own actions and therefore is not cruel and
unusual.199 Most likely, a general challenge to the Virginia sex
offender registration would also result in a finding of constitu-
tionality under the Eighth Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The policy rationales underlying the Virginia sex offender
registration statute are clearly legitimate and admirable legisla-
tive considerations. A state has a responsibility to protect its
citizens from criminals, to take steps to prevent future crimes,
and to punish those who break its laws. Particularly troubling,
however, in the context of registration statutes is the weakness
of the evidence on which legislatures rely to support their con-
tention that all types of sex offenders are more likely recidivists
than other violent offenders. Such questionable data should not
support a legislature's decision to single out all sex offenders
from other (some, arguably, more dangerous) criminals and label
them as risks to society whether or not they pose such a risk
and thus deny them the opportunity to obtain certain kinds of
employment. More specifically, the most troubling aspect of the
Virginia statute is its stated objective of preventing registered
197. See Hart v. Commonwealth, 109 S.E. 582, 588 (Va. 1921) (declining to follow Weems
because only four justices had joined the opinion).
198. See State v. Lammie, 793 P.2d 134, 140 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); People v. King, 20
Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 225 (Ct. App. 1991); In re DeBeque, 260 Cal. Rptr. 441, 449 (Ct. App.
1989); People v. Mora, 206 Cal. Rptr. 256, 258 (Ct. App. 1984); People v. Mills, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 411, 415 (Ct. App. 1978); Ohio v. Douglas, 586 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ohio App. 1989).
199. People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (11. 1991).
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sex offenders from obtaining employment in which the offender
would have direct contact with children. A person who committed
a rape ten years prior to his release from prison must register
with local law enforcement upon his release. Although he may
petition a court for expungement of his name from the registry
on a showing that he no longer poses a "risk" to society, he still
has the initial duty to register. As a result, he could be prevented
from working with children even though his offense was not
committed against a child victim and he may never have posed
a risk to children at all. That he does not pose such a risk does
not negate the fact that the crime of rape is certainly a heinous
crime, but it also does not provide a rationale for preventing him
from working with children.
This argument could be used in a semi-as-applied, semi-facial
challenge to the Virginia statute. A defendant could challenge
the application of the statute as applied to certain categories of
felons who committed their offenses against adults. Of course,
the court must be willing to accept some sort of a proportionality
test. Ideally for the defendant, the court would adopt the ap-
proach of the California courts in In re Reed and In re King and
apply a full-fledged, three-part proportionality test. Virginia courts,
however, have not been receptive to this approach. In 1921, in
Hart v. Commonwealth,211 the Virginia Supreme Court held that
it was not required to apply such a proportionality test because
the United States Supreme Court had left the question "open."
Fortunately, however, the United States Supreme Court has since
more fully developed its Eighth Amendment doctrine. Although
after Harmelin v. Michigan the proportionality test does not have
the reach it had when it was set forth in Solem v. Helm, the
Eighth Amendment encompasses at least a "grossly dispropor-
tionate" standard. Virginia courts, therefore, may not provide
less protection than such a standard, but may choose to provide
more.
In summary, Virginia's sex offender registration statute may
serve important state policy objectives, but those objectives may
be outweighed by other considerations. Although the state has
the power to protect children and assist law enforcement, it must
accomplish those goals without infringing on the constitutional
rights of its citizens. Sex offender registration arguably is pun-
ishment and it may be cruel and unusual as applied to certain
200. 109 S.E. 582 (Va. 1921).
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categories of felons. In all, the statute appears not to violate the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
and will probably be upheld under challenges that it is a facially
invalid statute violative of the Eighth Amendment.
